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in the Public Sector 
Steven G. Allen 
Altogether, it's  one sweet deal: generous pay and benefits, lifetime 
job security, meaningless performance evaluation, and, last, but not 
least, protection from all the swings of fortune that affect workers 
in private industry. 
Alan Crawford,  Washington  Monthly, January 1983 
10.1  Introduction 
The question of how public sector employers adjust employment in 
periods of declining demand would not have been considered a serious 
issue until the last half of the 1970s. Employment at both the state and 
local levels grew at such a rapid and sustained pace before then that 
this issue arose only in a few isolated cases. This all changed with the 
1974-75  recession and the widespread adoption of tax and expenditure 
limitations such as  Proposition 13 in California. Since 1975, government 
employment has declined as a share of total employment, and since 
1980 it has stayed about constant in absolute terms. As a result, many 
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governments have been forced to make hard decisions about how to 
trim their payrolls. 
This paper examines how public sector unions  have been able to 
influence these decisions. Studies by Medoff (1979) and Blau and Kahn 
(1983) on the impact  of  unions  on labor market adjustment in  the 
private sector have found much higher temporary and indefinite layoff 
rates for union than for nonunion workers. There is mixed evidence 
on how unions  affect permanent layoff  rates. Freeman and Medoff 
(1984) report that permanent  layoff  rates  calculated  for three-digit 
manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1971 and in  1981 show no 
difference  between industries that are predominantly  unionized and 
those that are not, but they also show that the May 1973-75 and 1977 
Current Population Surveys (CPS) for manufacturing workers indicate 
lower permanent layoff rates for union members. Blau and Kahn find 
higher  permanent layoff  rates for union  than  nonunion  workers in 
manufacturing  in  the National  Longitudinal  Survey (NLS) younger 
male  cohort,  but  no  union-nonunion  difference  for manufacturing 
workers in  the NLS older male  cohort.  When  they  expand  these 
samples to include all sectors except construction, they find unionism 
has no effect on the probability of permanent layoff for either younger 
or older males. 
Section 10.2 compares the postwar trend in unemployment rates for 
private  and public  sector workers and reports the first estimates of 
layoff rates for public sector workers. These results show that although 
there has been some convergence of the unemployment rates of these 
two groups, the odds of being on layoff remain much lower in the public 
sector. Among public sector workers, layoff probabilities are consid- 
erably lower for union members, a marked contrast to the pattern of 
higher layoff rates under unionism in the private sector. 
Sections 10.3 and 10.4 compare both the theoretical and institutional 
factors that influence employment adjustment decisions in the public 
and private sector and point out how the impact of unionism is likely 
to vary between the two sectors. The May  1973-75  and  1983 Current 
Population Surveys and the 1976-82 Panel Survey of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) are used  in  sections 10.5 and  10.6 to estimate public-private 
and union-nonunion differences in unemployment and layoff probabil- 
ities.  The main  results, summarized  in  section  10.7, are:  (I) unions 
reduce by a substantial amount the already low layoff and unemploy- 
ment probabilities in the public sector in contrast to those in the private 
sector,  where  layoff  rates  are  much  higher  under  unionism,  and 
(2) nonunion  public  sector workers have temporary layoff rates and 
overall unemployment  probabilities comparable to those of nonunion 
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10.2  Public Sector Layoff and Unemployment Rates 
Unemployment  rates for all  civilian  workers and  for government 
workers are presented in figure 10.1. Both series exhibit a rising trend 
over time, a reflection of  well-known  structural changes in the labor 
market. What is less apparent in figure  10.1, but can be shown easily 
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Fig. 10.1  Unemployment rates for nonagricultural private wage and 
salary workers and for government workers, 1948-85 274  Steven G. Allen 
unemployment rates has narrowed throughout this period. Let UGOV  = 
unemployment rate for government workers, UTOT = unemployment 
rate for nonagricultural private wage and salary workers, and T = time 
trend  (1 for  1948, . . . , 38 for  1985). These variables  were  used  to 
estimate the following equation: 
UGOV = 1.373 + 0.086*UTOT - 0.027*T + 0.0117*T*UTOT 
(0.528)  (0.095)  (0.024)  (0.0037) 
R2 = 0.854 
This equation shows that for a given national unemployment rate, the 
unemployment rate for government workers was considerably higher 
in the later part of the sample period.  For a civilian unemployment 
rate of 6 percent, this model predicts that the government unemploy- 
ment rate for 1948 would be  1.9 percent, but in  1985 it would be 3.5 
percent.  In other words, controlling for the overall state of  the labor 
market, unemployment of government workers is almost twice as high 
today as in the late 1940s. 
Mean layoff  rates for public and private  sector workers from the 
1973-84  May CPS are reported in table  10.1. These layoff statistics 
represent the share of the labor force unemployed in the survey week 
because of a layoff. They are not at all comparable to the layoff rates 
that used  to be published by  the Bureau of  Labor Statistics (BLS), 
which reported the fraction of workers (instead of the labor force) laid 
Table 10.1  Percentage of  Experienced Labor Force on Layoff, by  Year and 
Class of Worker 
Temporary and Indefinite Layoff  Permanent Layoff 
Public  Public 
Sector  Sector 
Private  Public  Excluding  Private  Public  Excluding 
Year  Sector  Sector  Education  Sector  Sector  Education 
1973  0.63 
1974  0.70 
1975  2.44 
1976  1.15 
I977  0.93 
1978  0.72 
1979  0.72 
1980  1.92 
1981  1.42 
1982  2.08 
1983  2.06 





























































Source: May CPS public use tapes. 275  Unions and Job Security 
off in a particular month (rather than all previous months). The sample 
is restricted to the May surveys because of the availability of data on 
union status in that month and the computational burden of using all 
of the monthly tapes over a twelve-year interval. One problem with 
using the May survey for estimating public sector layoff rates is that 
educational employees are unlikely to be on layoff in that month. To 
adjust for this bias, separate estimates are reported for the public sector 
with schools, colleges, and universities excluded from the sample. 
Temporary layoffs are those with recall within less than thirty days, 
whereas indefinite layoffs are those with recall within thirty days or 
more or those with no definite recall date. Because of the very small 
number of public sector workers experiencing either of these types of 
layoffs, the sum of these two layoff rates is reported in table 10.1. Both 
are distinguished from permanent layoffs by  the expectation of recall. 
The permanent layoff rate is the fraction of the experienced labor force 
consisting of unemployed workers who said they started looking for 
work because they had lost their previous job. 
Average temporary and indefinite layoff probabilities in May for 1973 
through  1984 are about four times greater in the private than in the 
public sector. Between 0.6 and 2.4 percent of  the experienced labor 
force in the private sector was on temporary or indefinite layoff during 
those years. The corresponding layoff probabilities for the public sector 
are not only much lower but their range is much narrower-between 
0.2 and 0.5 percent for all public sector employees and between 0.2 
and 0.6 percent for public sector employees excluding education. Al- 
though the time period under consideration is quite narrow, the patterns 
for  1975-76,  1980-81,  and  1982-83  indicate that the peak  in  layoff 
rates for the public sector lags that for the private sector by one year. 
There is no evidence that the ratio of the public to the private temporary 
and indefinite layoff rate has changed between 1973 and 1984. 
Permanent layoff rates also are much greater in  the private sector, 
but the relative gap between public and private permanent layoff rates 
seems to have narrowed in recent years. Between 1973 and 1977, per- 
manent layoff rates were about three times larger in the private sector 
than in the public sector (two and a half times larger when education 
is excluded from the public sector). This gap has narrowed to about 
two and a half times larger between  1978 and  1984 (two times larger 
when education is excluded from the public sector). This narrowing is 
largely attributable to upward drift in the permanent layoff rate in the 
public sector. The layoff rate for all public sector employees was 0.5 
percent in 1973 and 1974 but never fell below 0.8 percent in later years. 
The pattern is more pronounced when education is excluded; the layoff 
rate was 0.7 and 0.6 percent in  1973 and 1974 but never fell below  1.1 
percent thereafter. 276  Steven G.  Allen 
Even though the average public employee is subject to a very low 
layoff risk, this may be attributable to differences in the type of work 
between the public and the private sector. To  determine whether any 
public sector workers are subject to layoff risks comparable to those 
for the average private sector worker, layoff rates for public and private 
sector employees are reported  for selected industries in table  10.2. 
Because of small samples in individual years, the data are summarized 
in three-year groups. 
These results show that the risk of temporary or indefinite layoff is 
greatest for public sector jobs in construction, utilities, and federal and 
state public administration.  However,  these  layoff  rates  are almost 
always far below those for the average private sector worker in table 
Table 10.2  Percentage of  Experienced Labor Force on Layoff, by Time Period and 
Industry 
Temporary and Indefinite Layoff  Permanent Layoff 
Industry  1973-75  1976-78  1979-81  1982-84  1973-75  1976-78  1979-81  1982-84 
Construction 
Public  0.75 
Private  3.15 
bus lines 
Public  0.22 
Private  0.00 
sanitary services 
Public  0.00 
Private  0.20 
Public  0.20 
Private  0.12 
secondary schools 
Public  0.03 
Private  0.16 
Public  0.18 
Private  0.26 
Postal service  0.13 
Federal public 
administration  0.26 
State public 
administration  0.46 
Local public 






















































































































Source: May CPS public use tapes. 277  Unions and Job Security 
10.  I. The only exceptions to this general trend are employees in state 
public administration in 1976-78 and in urban transit in  1982-84.  The 
odds of temporary or indefinite layoffs are practically zero in education 
and the postal service. Permanent layoffs in the public sector are most 
likely to occur in construction, utilities, and local public administration. 
Except for construction, these layoff rates are also well below those 
in the private sector in table 10.1. 
The public-private comparisons within particular industry groups for 
temporary and indefinite layoffs in table 10.2 show that layoff rates are 
roughly equal in the public and private sectors in transportation, util- 
ities, hospitals, and education, but that private sector layoff rates are 
much higher in  construction. The patterns for permanent layoffs are 
quite different. Although the private sector has higher permanent layoff 
rates in construction,  transportation, and elementary and secondary 
schools, the public sector has higher permanent layoff rates in utilities 
and hospitals. These patterns suggest that careful controls for industry 
characteristics will  be needed to estimate accurately the difference in 
layoff and unemployment probabilities between the public and private 
sectors. 
Comparisons of mean layoff rates for union and nonunion workers 
in the public and private sectors are reported in table 10.3. These can 
be computed only for 1973-1975  and 1977 because in all other years 
unemployed workers were not asked about union membership. Within 
the public sector, temporary and indefinite layoff probabilities are slightly 
lower (0.1 percentage points) for union workers. The average gap in 
permanent layoff rates is also rather small in three out of the four years. 
However, the exception to this overall tendency is a very important 
one. In 1975, at the trough of a severe recession, the permanent layoff 
rate for nonunion public employees was twice as large (1.4 percent) as 
that for union workers (0.7 percent). This suggests that when the pres- 
Table 10.3  Percentage of Experienced Labor Force on Layoff, by Year, Class 
of Worker, and Union Status 
Temporary and Indefinite Layoff  Permanent Layoff 
Private Sector  Public Sector  Private Sector  Public Sector 
Year  Union  Nonunion  Union  Nonunion  Union  Nonunion  Union  Nonunion 
1973  1.22  0.45  0.24  0.16  1.74  1.36  0.37  0.55 
1974  1.54  0.44  0.08  0.22  1.88  1.50  0.71  0.47 
1975  5.56  1.58  0.04  0.28  4.26  3.45  0.72  1.38 
1977  1.80  0.69  0.20  0.30  2.98  2.52  0.67  0.93 
Source: May CPS public use tapes. 278  Steven G.  AUen 
sure for layoffs is greatest, union workers in the public sector have a 
much better chance of  keeping their jobs than nonunion public em- 
ployees. The exact opposite pattern is observed in the private sector, 
where union members have considerably higher layoff rates than non- 
union workers. 
10.3  Unions and Public Sector Layoffs: Theory 
Demand shocks are likely to differ between the public and private 
sectors because of differences in technology and consumer character- 
istics. For instance, labor demand in agriculture and construction fluc- 
tuates a great deal over the course of a year because of the dictates of 
seasons and weather, whereas except for elementary and secondary 
education, public sector labor demand consists of  services provided 
throughout the year. Demand for public services is also relatively in- 
sensitive to conditions in credit markets, in  contrast to some goods 
produced in the private sector, such as construction and durable man- 
ufactures. These arguments indicate that there will be less seasonal 
and cyclical variability in demand for public services than for private 
goods, which will result in lower layoff rates in the public sector, other 
things equal. 
Even if public and private employers had to deal with the same labor 
demand shocks, there are still a number of reasons to expect them to 
have different layoff rates. Two obvious factors are purely technolog- 
ical-public  services cannot be produced for inventory in periods of 
slack demand, and they are very labor intensive. As a result, cuts in 
government budgets almost always require some cuts in payroll. 
These cuts must be obtained by some combination of reduced wages, 
reduced hours, or reduced employment. Most government jobs are at 
the state and local levels, where wage studies such as Smith (1977) and 
Freeman (1985) tend to find rates equal to those in the private sector. 
In such a situation, wage cuts would produce savings in the short run 
but would eventually result in higher turnover and excessive recruiting, 
hiring, and training costs. Wage cuts in federal jobs would be less likely 
to create these problems, as all studies have found those rates to be 
well above those paid in comparable private sector jobs. The trade-off 
between hours and employment cuts will be heavily influenced by the 
attractive fringe benefit packages offered by  most public sector em- 
ployers and the relatively small amount of  specific on-the-job training 
in many government jobs, especially in education. Both of these factors 
will make it more economical to use layoffs instead of hours reductions 
in many public sector jobs. 
This assumes, however, that all downward shifts in demand are ac- 
tually translated into budget cuts. Throughout the 1970s state and local 279  Unions and Job Security 
governments were highly successful in obtaining federal aid under var- 
ious guises (revenue sharing, CETA) to maintain programs that would 
have been terminated  otherwise. On various occasions local govern- 
ments also have received fiscal infusions from state governments. This 
avenue of revenue enhancement is not available to the federal govern- 
ment, but it does not have to meet the balanced budget constraint that 
most state and local governments face. All of these examples illustrate 
how governments can find substitutes for tax revenue (some of which 
are automatically tied to local unemployment rates and thus indirectly 
tied to the revenue of state and local governments) to maintain their 
budgets and thereby avoid layoffs. 
Freeman (1985) has shown that public sector employment has less 
year-to-year  variability  than  private  sector employment. His study, 
along with the results on mean layoff rates in table 10.1, also suggests 
that the cyclical pattern in public sector employment lags that observed 
for private sector employment. 
These patterns probably result from differences in sources  of revenue 
between the public and private sectors. Much of the revenue of state 
and local governments comes from sources well insulated from cyclical 
behavior, such as property taxes and intergovernmental grants. (Fluc- 
tuations in revenue would arise mainly from income and sales taxes, 
which would vary with output and sales in a particular state, county, 
or city.) This dampens the impact of any shock. 
Lags in making adjustments to any given shock result from the po- 
litical process. If  these lags are long enough, managers in the public 
sector have more time to plan their manpower responses to declines 
in demand. This allows them to make greater use of hiring freezes, 
which allow them to reduce their adjustment costs by I) avoiding hiring 
persons who will later have to be laid off and 2) using attrition to reduce 
the number of employees, thereby avoiding the costs of layoffs (sev- 
erance pay, unemployment benefits, reputation). An adequate planning 
horizon  is absolutely essential  for hiring freezes to be a very useful 
adjustment device. The incentive to use hiring freezes and attrition in 
the public sector in place of layoffs will be offset to some extent by 
low rates of voluntary turnover, which result in smaller reductions in 
employment levels through attrition than in the private sector. 
It would  be  inappropriate to discuss public-private  differences  in 
layoff  probabilities  and  completely  ignore  unemployment  insurance 
(UI). Today almost all private and government employees are covered 
by UI, so differences in coverage are not likely to create differences 
in  employee preferences  for layoffs relative to other adjustment de- 
vices. The low unemployment rates in the public sector make it quite 
unlikely that any group of public sector workers will collectively receive 
more in benefits than they spend on payroll taxes. In fact, many gov- 280  Steven G.  Allen 
ernments finance  UI benefits  for their workers  through  direct reim- 
bursement rather than using payroll tax contributions. Thus, UI will 
encourage layoffs to  a lesser degree in the public than the private sector. 
The above discussion  indicates that the factors likely  to influence 
layoff decisions in the public sector are quite distinct from those in the 
private sector. In the absence of collective bargaining, no unambiguous 
predictions can be made about how layoff and unemployment rates are 
likely to vary between the public and private sectors. 
Under collective bargaining,  median voter models predict  that, in 
both the public and private sectors, greater weight will be given to the 
preferences of older, less mobile workers in the determination of per- 
sonnel policies. Except in cases of drastic declines in demand, these 
workers will prefer a policy of layoffs based on seniority. Such a policy 
completely insulates them from any cutbacks in wages or hours that 
might otherwise be required. 
Another factor behind the preference of unions in the private sector 
for seniority-based layoffs is the union-nonunion differential in UI sub- 
sidies. This is not likely to be important in the public sector because, 
as noted above, the financing mechanisms and low layoff rates result 
in effective self-insurance. Furthermore, supplemental unemployment 
benefits are rarely  provided  in  union contracts in  the public  sector. 
These two factors suggest that the union-nonunion gap in layoff rates 
should at least be smaller in the public than the private sector. 
In addition, there are unique aspects of unionism in the public sector 
that could result in lower layoff rates for union workers in that sector. 
Freeman (1986) argues that public sector unions have the ability to shift 
the demand curve for their services through political activity.  Public 
sector union members represent a significant part of the electorate in 
many state and local elections. This allows them to use both political 
power and bargaining power to  push for higher wages and membership. 
In addition, the utility function of public sector unions will put a higher 
weight on membership because additional members give them even 
more political leverage. Whether public sector unions are actually suc- 
cessful in obtaining higher wages and employment is an empirical ques- 
tion, however, because they can also serve as a lightning rod for attracting 
political opposition to the higher taxes required to fund higher payrolls. 
This political  dimension  of union behavior  in the public sector is 
likely  to influence  layoffs through  two different channels. First, the 
observed lag of employment in the public sector suggests that unions 
as well as  managers have the opportunity to plan strategies for avoiding 
layoffs. This can be done in a variety of different ways, such as mod- 
eration in wage negotiations or political pressure within the appropriate 
government body  to keep its payrolls  intact. Second, public  sector 
unions at the local and state levels can also push for additional revenue 281  Unions and Job Security 
from higher levels of government as a substitute for any drop in local 
or state tax revenues. For instance, in Congress public sector unions 
have been strong supporters of CETA which, under Titles I, 11,  and 
VI, granted  sizeable  sums for public employment  programs. These 
programs prevented a number of cities from having to lay off municipal 
employees. 
On balance, the effect of unions on layoffs in the public sector cannot 
be predicted ex ante. Although the most senior workers would prefer 
a system of layoffs based on seniority if payroll cuts are required, the 
potential political power of  unions may enable them to prevent such 
cuts from taking place or make them considerably smaller than they 
would have been in the absence of collective bargaining. 
10.4  Unions and Public Sector Layoffs: Institutions 
Rules and procedures governing layoffs in the nonunion segment of 
the public sector, if  they exist at all, are determined by legislation or 
regulation. There has been only one study to my  knowledge of  layoff 
policies in the public sector. A  survey of  state governments by  the 
Bureau of National Affairs (1982a) found that twenty states based lay- 
offs primarily or solely on seniority, twenty-four have policies that take 
both seniority and performance into account, and six states have no 
laws or policies on layoffs. Even in states in which layoffs are based 
on both seniority and performance, managers sometimes do not have 
much discretion in deciding who is to be laid off. For instance, in Utah 
layoffs are based on the sum of the employee’s rankings with respect 
to previous performance evaluations and seniority. In many cases vet- 
erans are given special preference in layoff or recall procedures. 
During the 1981-82 recession, a number of states revised their layoff 
procedures to ensure that recent gains in hiring women and minorities 
were not eradicated by  “last hired, first fired” policies. The Bureau of 
National Affairs (1982b) identified five states in which state agencies 
were required to maintain a percentage of women and minorities after 
a layoff equal to that in the agency prior to the layoff. In many other 
cases, managers were instructed to take affirmative action into con- 
sideration along with other criteria in deciding which persons were to 
be laid off and which were to be recalled. 
Under collective  bargaining in  the  private  sector,  procedures  for 
layoffs are almost always specified in the union contract. Freeman and 
Medoff  (1984) report  that  seniority  is  the most  important  factor in 
determining who gets laid off in about 80 percent of all contracts. Five 
different studies by BLS of contract provisions between 1970 and 1975 
indicate that these practices were not as widespread in the public sector. 
The percentage of employees covered by  agreements containing var- 282  Steven G.  Allen 
ious layoff-related provisions in these studies is reported in table 10.4. 
Most of the municipal agreements in cities with populations of 250,000 
and over in  1970 contained no provisions regarding layoffs. This can 
be attributed to a combination of  three factors:  1) the recentness of 
most collective bargaining relationships  in  that period, 2) layoff pro- 
cedures already specified by ordinances or civil service regulations that 
in many cases were presumably based at least in part on seniority, and 
3) the rapid growth in  municipal employment that had taken place in 
preceding years. Given these three factors, most unions at that time 
apparently placed  little priority  on bargaining over layoff and recall 
provisions.  Collaborating  evidence for the  BLS studies is found  in 
Eberts’s (forthcoming) study of over 500 New York school districts in 
the mid- 1970s-only  20 percent of public school teachers were covered 
by reduction-in-force (RIF) provisions. 
Even five years later, the share of union contracts containing layoff 
and recall provisions in the public sector, although much higher than 
before, was still much smaller than that in the private sector. Only 65 
percent of the contracts during this period contained language pertain- 
ing to layoffs and only 35 percent specified recall rights. Both figures 
are considerably higher than their counterparts in 1970, which no doubt 
reflects the decline in the fiscal health of many cities over this period 
as well as increased experience with how layoffs are conducted under 
civil service rules. Perry’s (1979) case study of nine school systems 
also points out a trend toward a greater percentage of teachers’ union 
contracts containing layoff provisions. He found that in 1967 contrac- 
tual  provisions  regarding  layoffs were  “virtually  nonexistent.”  Ten 
years later, the contracts in eight of the nine school districts contained 
language regarding layoffs. 
Even if union contracts in  the public sector are still less likely to 
address layoff issues than contracts in the private sector, it seems safe 
to conclude that much greater weight is given to seniority in determining 
layoffs in governments with collective bargaining agreements than in 
those without collective bargaining. There is also evidence that contract 
provisions do affect layoff decisions in the public sector. Eberts shows 
that RIF provisions are correlated with much lower separation rates 
for teachers in school districts with declining enrollment, especially for 
teachers with more than nine years of experience. 
Layoff provisions are far from the only mechanism that public sector 
unions  have  to influence government behavior.  Levine,  Rubin, and 
Wolohojian (1981) discuss a case in Oakland  where the fire fighters 
union used  binding arbitration to reverse  a city  council decision to 
eliminate twenty-six positions in  1975. In other cases unions have ex- 
erted political pressure to prevent cutbacks. For instance, in  1976 the 
police and fire fighters unions in Cincinnati petitioned for a referendum Table 10.4  Percentage of Workers Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreements with Selected Layoff Provisions 
Municipal  Police and Fire  State and County  State and Local  State and Local 
Agreements 1970  Agreements, 1972-73  Agreements,  1972-73  Agreements,  1 Jan. 1974  Agreements, 1  July  1975 
Reference to 
Advance notice 
Union role in 
reduction in force  1.7 
Bumping 
procedures  6.4 
Recall rights  18.6 
reduction in force  - 




















Source: BLS Bulletin, nos. 1759, 1861, 1885, 1920, 1947. 284  Steven G.  Allen 
to freeze staffing at current levels (the petition did not pass). To protest 
the proposed  transfer  of  a  state-managed hospital  in  Pennsylvania, 
Wilburn and Worman (1980) report that five unions successfully joined 
forces to exert pressure, including radio, newspaper, and television 
advertisements telling residents in  the  area where the  hospital  was 
located that it was vital to their welfare. 
A final factor that may  be important in  some of the period under 
study here is the endogeneity of UI coverage for many state and local 
employees before December 1974. Before 1972, when state employees 
in hospitals and higher education were brought into the system, rela- 
tively few state and local public sector employees were covered by 
UI. Some states had voluntarily decided to cover their own employees, 
and a few even had laws requiring all local employees to participate. 
Title I1 of the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 
1974 (PL 93-567) brought almost all state and local workers into the 
system. Although this program was supposedly a temporary measure 
prompted by the 1974-75 recession, the Unemployment Compensation 
Amendments of  1976 (US. Congress 1976) made these changes per- 
manent. Before these federal statutes were enacted, the political power 
of public sector unions could increase the odds of UI coverage in areas 
that were heavily unionized, which would result in  somewhat higher 
layoff rates. However, Allen (1987) found little evidence supporting 
this conjecture; there is only a weak correlation between unionization 
and UI coverage and no correlation between UI coverage and unem- 
ployment and layoff probabilities in the CPS. 
10.5  Evidence from the Current Population Survey 
To identify the separate effects of unionism and public sector status 
on layoff probabilities, two specifications were estimated over the May 
1973-75 CPS. The first includes separate dummies for union and public 
sector status; the second adds a union-public  sector interaction term. 
The extremely large sample size precludes estimation of  probit equa- 
tions over all observations. Probit results for one-fourth of the sample, 
randomly selected, appear in  table 10.5. Temporary layoff equations 
were not estimated for this sample because none of the public sector 
workers in the smaller sample were on temporary layoff. 
10.5.1  Public-Private Comparisons 
How do layoff rates for public and private sector workers compare? 
Once controls for union status and other job and personal character- 
istics are included, are the layoff probabilities for public sector workers 
still very  small relative  to those  of  private  sector employees? The 
answers from the first specification largely reaffirm the results from Table 10.5  Coemcients of  Union and Public Sector Status in CPS Unemployment Probit Equations 
Model  1: No Interaction  Model 2: Union-Public  Section Interaction 
Sample and  Mean of 
Dependent Variable  Dependent Variable  Union  Public Sector  Union  Public Sector  Interaction 
A.  1973-75 CPS (N = 38,739) 
I.  Indefinite layoff  0.0086  0.178  -0.363  0.205  -  0.162  -  0.700 
(0.054)  (0.145)  (0.055)  (0.158)  (0.319) 
[0.0012]  [ -0.00161  [0.0015]  [ -0.OOOSl  [ -0.00191 
2.  Permanent layoff  0.0184  -  0.009  -  0.233  0.010  -0.178  -0.210 





5. Unemployed, any reason  0.0554  0.047 
4.  Quit last job  0.0073  -0.053 
(0.029) 
[0.0042] 
B.  1983 CPS (N = 22,803) 
Unemployed during 1982  0.148  -0.032 
(0.028) 
(0.042)  (0.080) 
[-0.00031  [ -  0.00661 
0.169 
(0.07  I) 
[0.0052] 
-  0.024 
(0.102) 




-  0.329 
(0.048) 
(0.044) 





















[0  ,00061 




-  0.00561 
-  0.273 
(0.132) 
-  0.00561 
-  0.065 
(0.174) 
-  0.OOoSl 
-0.416 
(0.093) 
-  0.02611 
-  0.255 
(0.068) 
[ -0.0061  [ -0.0601  [0.005]  [ -0.0441  [ -  0.0461 
Nore: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and the partial derivative of  the probability of the dependent variable at the mean values of the 
independent variables is reported in brackets. Each equation also contains the following variables: age and its square, years of schooling completed, 
and binary indicators of  race (I),  sex, marital status (I), region (3), occupation (I I),  industry (34 for 1973-75 and 37 for 1983), and year (2 in  1973- 
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table  10.1. For both types of layoffs under consideration, the results 
indicate that layoff rates are much lower in the public sector: 0.2 per- 
centage points lower for indefinite layoffs, and 0.7 percentage  points 
lower for permanent layoffs. 
The second model allows these comparisons to be made separately 
for union  and  nonunion  workers. The results  show that the public- 
private difference in layoff rates for nonunion workers is smaller than 
the public-private  difference for union  and  nonunion  workers com- 
bined.  There is no public-private  difference  in  indefinite  layoffs for 
nonunion workers. The public-private difference in permanent layoffs 
is slightly smaller for nonunion workers than for union and nonunion 
workers combined. 
Events initiating spells of unemployment for the experienced labor 
force include not only layoffs, but also quits and labor force reentries. 
To  get a complete picture of how job security compares in the public 
and private  sectors, quits and  labor force reentries should  also be 
examined, especially the latter.  Previous research by Clark and Sum- 
mers  (1979), among others, shows frequent transitions  between the 
states of unemployment and out of the labor force. These transitions 
have raised the question of whether being unemployed is behaviorally 
distinct from being out of the labor force, as many transitions  could 
arise from measurement  error or temporary cessation of job search. 
There is a clear possibility that many of the persons who are classified 
as labor force reentrants were laid off before the survey period. If so, 
then ignoring labor force reentrants may result in a biased comparison 
of public and private sector  job security. 
The drawback with using the information on labor force reentry is 
the difficulty in interpreting the results. It is impossible to distinguish 
between persons who left their last jobs voluntarily and those who were 
laid off. Despite the problems with interpretation of labor force reen- 
trant behavior, the empirical results should provide a more complete 
picture of relative job stability in the public and private sectors. The 
impact of union and public sector status on unemployment attributable 
to labor force reentry, along with unemployment resulting from quits 
and total  unemployment  regardless  of source is  reported in the last 
three rows of panel A of table  10.5. 
In both models, workers whose last job was in the public sector are 
much more likely to be unemployed labor force reentrants than workers 
whose  last job was in  the private  sector. The results for the second 
model show that this relationship holds for nonunion, but not union, 
public sector workers. Nonunion public sector workers are 0.7 percent 
more likely than nonunion private sector workers and 0.8 percent more 
likely than union private sector workers to be unemployed force reen- 
trants. These results, although difficult to interpret, suggest that the 287  Unions and Job Security 
lower permanent layoff rates observed in the public sector may not tell 
the entire story about job security  in  the public  sector. One of two 
things is certain: either the public-private difference in layoff rates for 
nonunion workers is overstated in table 10.5 or unemployment resulting 
from voluntary turnover is higher in the public than the private sector 
for nonunion workers. 
In contrast to other studies (e.g., Long 1982) that have found lower 
voluntary turnover in the public sector, the odds that a person will quit 
his last job to search for a new job are no lower for public than for 
private sector workers. The discrepancy between this finding and those 
of  earlier  studies  is  probably  attributable to the narrowness of  the 
turnover variable in the CPS, which does not report quits unless they 
are followed by a spell of unemployment. 
Further evidence on quits from the PSID is reported in table  10.6. 
(Details on how the data set was constructed are reported in section 
10.6.) These results show that quit rates for heads of households are 
lower in the public sector  than private sector. In the model which allows 
the public sector coefficient to vary for union and nonunion workers, 
quit probabilities in the public sector are 2.1 percent lower for nonunion 
workers and 0.3 percent lower for union workers than for their coun- 
terparts in the private sector. The estimated public-private differences 
for wives are very imprecise,  indicating that there is no pronounced 
quit differential for them. It is interesting to note that among both heads 
and wives the impact of union status on quits is smaller in the public 
sector. 
The key issue for interpreting the labor force reentry results in table 
10.5 is how quits accompanied by unemployment  compare for union 
and nonunion workers in the public sector. To examine this question, 
the dependent variable was set equal to one if  a person quit the job 
held a year ago and experienced unemployment  during the past year. 
These results, also reported in table 10.6, show a slightly lower prob- 
ability of quits followed by unemployment for union than for nonunion 
workers in the public sector. This evidence, along with earlier research, 
strongly rejects any possibility that unemployment associated with vol- 
untary turnover for nonunion  workers is higher  in  the public sector 
than in  the private  sector.  This means that the results  on layoffs in 
table 10.5 actually overstate the public-private difference in job security. 
The last row of  panel A in table 10.5 compares the odds that public 
and private  sector workers will  be unemployed  for any reason. The 
first specification shows unemployment rates are 0.8 percent lower in 
the public sector. This difference vanishes in the second specification- 
unemployment  probabilities  are the  same in  the public  and  private 
sectors for nonunion workers. In other words, considering all possible 
causes of unemployment together, nonunion public sector workers are Table 10.6  Coefficients of Union and Public Sector Status in PSID Unemployment, Quit, and Layoff Probit Equations 
Sample and 
Dependent Variable 
Model 1: No Interaction  Model 2: Union-Public Sector Interaction 
Mean of 
Dependent Variable  Union  Public Sector  Union  Public Sector  Interaction 
A.  Heads (N =  13,873) 
I. Quit previous job  0.083  -0.206 
(0.040) 
[ -  0.0261 
2.  Quit and unemployed during year  0.023  -0.253 
(0.067) 
[ -  0.0061 
3.  Unemployed during year  0.0154  0.190 
(0.033) 
[0.038] 















-  0.0301 






[-O.oOl]  [ -  0.0191  [ -  0.0031 







[ -  0.0031 
-  0.058 
(0.059) 
[-O.Oll] 








[ -  0.0031 
-  0.300 
(0.083) 
[ -  0.0491 
0. I09 
(0.121) 
[0.008] B. Wives (N = 3,796) 
I. Quit previous job  0.127  -0.295 
(0.087) 
[ -  0.0481 
2.  Quit and unemployed during year  0.022  -0.214 
(0.161) 




[ -  0.0071 
4.  Job loser  0.046  -  0.096 
-  0.030 
(0.082) 







[ -  0.0071 
-0.163 
-  0.375 
(0.113) 
[ -  0.0591 





-  0.035 
(0.124) 
I  -  0.0081 
-  0.065 
(0.088) 







-  0.0071 
-0.103 












[ -  0.0191 
Note: All equations are estimated over the PSID (1976-82  for heads, 1979-82  for wives). Each equation also contains the following variables: age 
and its square, tenure with employers and its square, years of schooling, number of children, and binary indicators of race (2),  region (3), occupation 
(51, industry (8),  and year (5 for heads, 2 for wives). Dummies for sex and marital status (I) are also included in the equation for heads. 290  Steven G. Allen 
just as likely to be unemployed  as nonunion private sector workers. 
The lower odds of permanent layoffs are offset by the greater odds of 
being an unemployed labor force reentrant. 
10.5.2  The Role of Unions 
The results from the second specification in table  10.5 can also be 
used to compare the impact of unions on  job security in the public and 
private sectors. Whereas union members in the private sector are 0.15 
percentage points more likely to be on indefinite layoff than nonunion 
members, this does not seem to be the case in the public sector. The 
coefficient implies  slightly lower indefinite layoff rates in  the public 
sector for union members, but the standard error is sufficiently large 
to prevent  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  union-nonunion 
difference. 
The impact of  unionism  on permanent layoffs  also is completely 
different in the public and private sectors. In the private sector, union 
members are just as likely  to be laid  off  permanently  as nonunion 
workers. In the public sector, permanent layoff rates are 0.5 percentage 
points lower for union than nonunion workers. These results on layoffs 
imply that public  sector unions  have  been  much more  successful  in 
promoting job security than their private sector counterparts. 
The evidence on unemployment due to quits and labor force reentry 
as well  as the evidence for all types of unemployment  combined  is 
consistent with this implication. Union members are less likely to be- 
come unemployed reentrants in both sectors, but the impact of union- 
ism is greater in the public  sector both in proportional and absolute 
terms. Surprisingly, there is no union-nonunion difference in quits re- 
sulting in unemployment in either the private or public sector. 
Looking across all  types of unemployment, the results  in the last 
row of panel  A  of table 10.5 show that union  members are 0.9 per- 
centage points more likely than nonunion workers to become unem- 
ployed in the private sector, but 1.8 percentage points less likely in the 
public sector. The impact of unions on job security is completely dif- 
ferent in the public and private sectors. Unions are associated with a 
higher unemployment  risk in private  sector jobs, but a lower risk of 
joblessness in the public sector. 
10.5.3  Retrospective Evidence for 1982 
Two key limitations of the results from the  1973-75  CPS are that 
1) during that period employment in the public sector was still growing 
and 2) many union contracts did not contain layoff provisions.  Since 
then, government budgets have been squeezed by legislation to limit 
taxes and expenditures as well as by a recession more severe than that 
in  1974-75.  This would presumably give unions less political flexibility 291  Unions and Job Security 
to maintain public sector payrolls, while at the same time make union 
members more  sensitive  to job security issues and in  all  likelihood 
increase the share of union contracts containing rules on layoffs. As a 
result, one would have good reason to question whether the results for 
1973-75  are still pertinent today. 
These results  cannot be replicated for more recent years, because 
after 1977 the CPS stopped asking unemployed workers about union 
status at their previous job. One alternative approach is to use the May 
1983 CPS, which reports union status for half the sample (instead of a 
quarter of the sample as in all other surveys since 1981) and matches 
these records with the March 1983 CPS, which contains retrospective 
data  on unemployment during 1982. At the cost of restricting the sample 
to employed  workers, union-nonunion  differences  in  unemployment 
during 1982 can be estimated for both the public and private sectors. 
Unemployed persons in the May 1983 sample consist of those who 
either were recalled to their old jobs or were successful in finding new 
jobs. Those who were still jobless at the time of the survey are omitted 
from the sample. This should be kept in mind  when interpreting the 
results; they are not directly comparable to those reported from the 
1973-75  CPS. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if  the 
respondent was  unemployed  during  1982. The distinctions  between 
union and nonunion as well as private and public workers are based 
on the job held at the time of the survey. (The models were also esti- 
mated over a data set in which these distinctions were based on the 
longest job held in  1982. The results were basically the same and are 
not reported here.) 
With regard to union-nonunion differences, the probit results in panel 
B of table 10.5 are comparable to those in panel A. The key result of 
a negative union  impact on unemployment  probability in  the public 
sector  from the 1973-75 CPS continues to hold for the 1982 CPS. Public 
employees belonging to unions were 4.1 percentage points less likely 
to have  been  unemployed  in  1982 than nonunion  public  employees. 
Union  workers are 0.5  percentage  points  more likely  to have  been 
unemployed than nonunion workers in the private sector, but the dif- 
ference is not statistically significant. 
The only finding from the 1973-75  CPS that does not carry over to 
the more recent sample is that pertaining to public-private differences 
in unemployment probabilities for nonunion workers. Nonunion public 
employees were 4.4  percentage points less likely to have been unem- 
ployed  in  1982 than nonunion private employees. This result is most 
likely attributable to either the restricted sample in the May 1983 CPS 
or the lagged response of public sector layoffs to downturns in eco- 
nomic activity documented in table  10.1; it need  not be inconsistent 
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10.6  Evidence from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics 
The PSID has reported both union status and class of worker on a 
continuous basis  since 1976. The main  advantages of  exploring this 
data set are that it spans the period between the two CPS samples and 
that it can be used to estimate fixed-effects  models. A possible dis- 
advantage is that the PSID sample consists of households that have 
been continuously tracked for fourteen years, and such households are 
likely to be less than perfectly representative of the labor force. 
Two different indicators  of job security  are examined:  1) whether 
the respondent is currently unemployed  or was unemployed  in  the 
past year, and 2) whether the respondent lost his previous job because 
he was laid off or fired or because his company closed (job losses for 
any of  these reasons will  be  referred  to as layoffs  below).  Survey 
responses to these questions in year t  + 1 are regressed on indepen- 
dent variables for year t. As in the CPS, the sample is restricted to 
wage and salary workers. When using the PSID, the question always 
arises as to whether observations from the 1967 Survey of Economic 
Opportunity (SEO) subsample  should  be  included.  In  this  case the 
coefficients are relatively insensitive to composition of the sample, so 
observations from  the  SEO  subsample are  included  in  the  results 
reported below. Split-off households formed during the sample period 
and persons who were self-employed during any of the sample years 
are deleted  to facilitate  data-set management.  Separate models  are 
estimated for heads of households (assumed by  the PSID to be the 
male in two-earner households) and wives. 
The PSID results for heads in table 10.6 show that, just as in the 
CPS, the odds of being unemployed are about the same for public and 
private  sector workers not  covered by collective  bargaining.  In the 
model without any interaction between union and public sector status, 
union employees have a 3.8  percentage point higher probability of being 
unemployed; public  sector employees, a  3.1 percentage  point  lower 
probability.  However, this model restricts the impact of unionism to 
be the same in both the public and private sectors. When this restriction 
is removed by adding a union-public sector interaction term, there is 
no longer any significant difference between the odds of being unem- 
ployed in public and private sector jobs for nonunion workers. Union 
workers in the private sector are 4.8 percentage points more likely to 
have been unemployed than nonunion workers, but there is no differ- 
ence in unemployment probabilities in the public sector between union 
and nonunion workers. 
Wives who are union members working in the private sector are 6.4 
percentage points more likely to experience unemployment than non- 
union workers in that sector. In the public sector, union members are 293  Unions and Job Security 
1.2 percentage points less likely to have been unemployed than non- 
union workers. Among nonunion workers there is once again no sig- 
nificant public-private difference in unemployment probabilities. 
Unionism has little impact on the odds that a person in the PSID 
will lose his job in  either the public or private sector. The union and 
union-public  sector interaction coefficients are both not significantly 
different from zero, in contrast to the CPS in which the interaction 
was negative.  Household  heads working in  the public sector are 2.1 
percentage points less likely to lose theirjobs regardless of union status, 
but the odds of job loss for wives are equal in the public and private 
sectors. 
A  final  way  to establish the  robustness  of  this result  over these 
samples is to estimate a fixed-effects model. Although it is now widely 
accepted that such models are not a panacea for biases associated with 
unobserved heterogeneity of workers who obtain jobs in the public and 
private sectors, it would be difficult to be very confident .in the findings 
in table 10.6 if they were completely inconsistent with the results from 
a fixed-effects specification. The fixed-effects results for heads (see 
table 10.7) are quite similar in terms of  the signs of the coefficients to 
the results reported above. The decrease in the size of the coefficients 
and the increase in the size of the standard errors is not surprising in 
light of results obtained in other studies with fixed-effects estimators. 
However, in  the wives  sample, the  coefficients actually  tend to be 
somewhat larger in the fixed-effects results.  There is no readily ap- 
parent reason for this unusual result. Whatever the reason, it is quite 
clear, even in the fixed-effects results, that the impact of unionism on 
the odds of becoming unemployed is quite different in the public and 
private sectors. 
Table 10.7  Fixed Effects Estimates of  PSID Unemployment 
Probability Equations 
Model 2: Union-Public 
Section Interaction  Model  1: No Interaction 
Sample  Union  Public Sector  Union  Public Sector  Interaction 
A. Heads  0.014  -0.013  0.024  -0.004  -  0.028 
(0.013)  (0.0  14)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.022) 
(0.036)  (0.029)  (0.043)  (0.031)  (0.058) 
B. Wives  0.017  0.020  0.078  0.050  -0.148 
Note: The dependent variable equals one for those who were unemployed during the 
year: zero, otherwise. Each equation also includes tenure with employer and its square, 
number of  children, and binary indicators of marital status (I), region (3), occupation 
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10.7  Conclusion 
The results of this paper show that much of the observed public- 
private difference in unemployment rates is attributable to the ability 
of unions to promote  job security in the public sector. Despite the much 
lower observed unemployment probabilities for workers in the public 
sector, once one controls for differences in worker and job character- 
istics,  the odds of being unemployed  are identical in the public  and 
private sectors for nonunion workers in the May 1973-75  CPS and the 
PSID. Even though public sector  jobs are less subject to seasonal and 
cyclical shocks and their cyclical patterns lag those in the private sector, 
these factors seem to be exactly offset by the inability to produce for 
inventory and the labor intensity of the production process in the public 
sector.  Although  the May  1983  CPS indicates  lower unemployment 
probabilities for nonunion  public  sector workers than for nonunion 
private sector workers, this could very well be attributable to the re- 
striction of the sample to employed persons or the lag of public sector 
layoff rates behind those in the private sector. One important impli- 
cation  of this result  is that failure to account for differences  in job 
security is not likely to systematically bias the results of public-private 
pay comparisons. 
This paper’s other major conclusion is that the impact of unions on 
unemployment and permanent layoff probabilities varies substantially 
between private and government  jobs. The odds of being unemployed 
are much higher under unionism in the private sector, but they tend to 
be lower for union than nonunion workers in the public sector. Previous 
studies have attributed the higher layoff rates for union  members in 
the private sector to the greater weight given to  the preferences of older 
workers under unionism, as reflected by the widespread use of layoffs 
by seniority in downturns, and larger benefits while unemployed (both 
from UI and supplemental benefit plans). The adjustment process in 
the public  sector operates differently  because the political power of 
public employee unions can be used in many cases to prevent budget 
cuts, an optimal outcome for both senior and junior employees. When 
cuts are necessary,  the absence of any UI subsidy or supplemental 
benefits makes layoffs a less attractive option for members of public 
sector  unions  than  other  adjustment  mechanisms  such  as  wage 
moderation. 
This paper has also reported new evidence on voluntary turnover in 
the public sector. The quit rate is lower in the public than the private 
sector for heads of households, but there is no public-private difference 
in quits for wives. Unions decrease voluntary turnover in both sectors, 
but they seem to  have a greater impact on turnover in the private sector. 
The evidence in  table  10.1 suggests that the public-private gap in 
unemployment and layoff rates has narrowed over time. As Joe Altonji 295  Unions and Job Security 
points out in his comments below, this is difficult to reconcile with the 
findings that unions promote job security in the public sector. Given 
the growth  of public  sector unionism,  one would expect this gap to 
have widened. This seeming paradox  can be resolved  by noting two 
offsetting factors. First, employment in  the public  sector has been 
growing much more slowly than in the private sector since the mid- 
1970s. Second, unions have lost ground in the private  sector, which 
should lower unemployment in that sector, other things equal. Each of 
these would narrow the difference in unemployment rates between the 
public and private sectors, and combined they could override the im- 
pact of growing public sector unionism. 
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Comment  Joseph G. Altonji 
Steven Allen has left few data sets unexplored in this straightforward 
and thorough empirical study of the effect of unions on layoff rates, 
quit rates, and unemployment rates of public and private sector work- 
ers. In discussing the paper,  I first comment on why this topic is of 
interest. I then  summarize the empirical analysis and  suggest some 
extensions. In my final comments, I suggest how the main result of the 
paper-that  union workers in the public sector have a lower probability 
of being on layoff than their nonunion counterparts-might  be exam- 
ined within a broader study of  the dynamics of labor demand in the 
public sector. 
Motivation for the Study 
Historically,  workers  in  public  sector jobs  have had  much  lower 
layoff and unemployment rates than private sector workers. There is 
also substantial evidence that in the private sector union workers ex- 
perience somewhat higher layoff rates than nonunion workers.  Fur- 
thermore,  there  are important  differences  in the legal and  political 
environment faced by public and private unions and in  the nature of 
public and private sector employers. Consequently, there are a number 
of  reasons to expect that the effects of  unionism on turnover and un- 
employment incidence is not the same in the public and private sector. 
Allen is the first to carefully investigate this issue. 
Joseph G.  Altonji is associate professor of economics, Northwestern University, and 
faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 297  Unions and Job Security 
There are at least three reasons why this question deserves careful 
consideration. First, the public sector accounts for about 20 percent 
of the work force.  Changes in labor market structure that alter turnover 
behavior and unemployment in the public sector may have important 
effects on the unemployment rate of the economy as a whole. 
Second, union effects on unemployment  risk are very important in 
evaluating the returns to union membership for public sector workers. 
Most previous studies have focused on wage gains or fringe benefits. 
Third, layoff behavior, wage flexibility, and hiring policies are among 
the factors that influence how governments respond to  changes in voter 
preferences and to exogenous shifts in grants and revenue. Do unions 
alter the dynamic efficiency and the responsiveness of government? 
Little  is  known  about this question. Indeed, little  is  known of  the 
dynamic behavior of governments in the production of goods and ser- 
vices. (See Holtz-Eakin [1986] for some evidence on dynamic adjust- 
ments in municipal expenditures and references to other studies.) 
Methodology and Results 
The main  purpose  of the econometric analysis  of the paper is  to 
document union-nonunion differences and public-private differences in 
turnover and unemployment rather than to explain them, although Al- 
len provides a good general discussion of how unions might affect layoff 
rates and unemployment  incidence  in  the public  sector and  of why 
public-private sector  differences in union effects are likely. Allen begins 
the empirical  analysis  by  using  CPS data files  for several  years to 
produce tables summarizing public-private  sector differences  in  the 
percentage  of the experienced labor force on layoff by year, type of 
layoff, and industry. These show that the percentage of workers on 
layoff is indeed much higher  in the private  sector than in the public 
sector. They also show that the union effect is positive (and strong) in 
the private sector. 
The heart of the paper is a careful multivariate analysis of the effects 
of unionism on unemployment  probabilities in the public and private 
sectors. Much of the analysis relates the probability of unemployment 
arising from a given  cause to a  set of  control variables,  a dummy 
variable for union  membership, a dummy variable for public sector 
employment, and the product of  the union  membership and public 
sector employment dummies. Separate equations are estimated for the 
probability of a spell of unemployment arising from a temporary layoff 
(reported in Allen 1986), indefinite layoff, permanent layoff, labor force 
reentrance, and a quit. Using the PSID, Allen also estimates equations 
I. Ehrenberg and Schwartz (1983). 298  Steven G.  Allen 
for quits and for permanent layoffs without distinguishing separations 
with and without unemployment. 
The most important control variables used in the analysis are oc- 
cupation dummies, industry dummies, age, and schooling. When work- 
ing with the PSID, Allen includes tenure with employer. The use of 
tenure can be defended but does reduce the comparability of the results 
across data sets and is  likely  to lead  to biases in  the fixed-effects 
estimates of the unemployment probability equations reported in table 
10.7. 
Allen estimates the probability of at least one spell of unemployment 
during 1982 using data obtained from the March 1983 CPS matched to 
information on union  status from the May  1983 CPS. Unfortunately, 
the union data are available only for workers employed in May. Such 
workers  are  likely  to  have  lower unemployment  probabilities  and 
stronger labor force attachment than a representative sample. As Allen 
points out, this makes it difficult to  draw inferences about changes over 
time in the effects of public sector  unionism on unemployment behavior. 
The main results in the paper and the more detailed evidence in Allen 
(1986) may be summarized as follows.2 
Differences between Union and Nonunion Workers in the Public Sector 
Allen’s most important result is that in the public sector union work- 
ers have  lower unemployment  probabilities and fewer weeks of  un- 
employment during  the  year  than  nonunion  workers.  The overall 
negative differential  in the unemployment  probability results from a 
substantially  smaller probability  of being unemployed  due to a per- 
manent layoff as well as a smaller probability of being unemployed as 
a result of reentering the labor force. I suspect that a partial explanation 
for the higher unemployment  probability associated with reentry ex- 
perienced by nonunion workers is participation by disadvantaged work- 
ers in public employment programs that are classified as nonunion. In 
1978  CETA  accounted  for  3.3  percent  of  total  state  and  local 
employment  .3 
Public sector union members have a slightly lower overall quit rate 
than their nonunion counterparts. This is consistent with a union wage 
premium in the public sector. 
2. Due to space constraints, Allen only reports estimates based on a pooled  sample 
of public and private sector workers. In the working paper version of the study (Allen 
1986), he reports separate estimates for public sector and private sector workers. Use 
of the separate samples permits the effects of  the control variables to vary across sectors. 
These estimates probably provide a more reliable indication of union-nonunion differ- 
ences in the two sectors, although they are qualitatively similar to  those Allen  does 
report here. 
3. Ehrenberg and Schwartz (1983). However, at least some of the CETA jobs were 
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Differences between Union and Nonunion Workers in the Private Sector 
Results for the 1973-75  CPS indicate that in the private sector union 
members have somewhat higher unemployment probabilities than non- 
union workers. The positive unemployment differential appears to be 
due primarily to differences in the incidence and duration of temporary 
and  indefinite  layoffs.  The analysis  of  the probability  of  a  spell  of 
unemployment during the year using the PSID shows that the proba- 
bility of at least one spell is about 25 percent higher for union workers 
than for nonunion. However, using the matched March and May 1983 
CPS files, Allen obtains a small negative estimate of the union differ- 
ential in the private sector for weeks of unemployment in  1982 (Allen 
1986, table 11). It is possible that this finding is an artifact of using a 
sample of workers who were employed in May of the following year. 
Overall, Allen’s results suggest that in the private sector union workers 
have higher unemployment probabilities than nonunion workers. 
In the private sector, union workers have lower quit rates. 
The Public-Private Differential among Union Workers 
Union workers in the public sector have much lower probabilities of 
being unemployed and only about half as  many weeks of unemployment 
during the year as their private sector counterparts (see Allen  1986). 
Most of the reduction may be attributed to the fact that few workers 
are on temporary or indefinite layoff in the public sector as well as to 
much lower probabilities of  being on permanent layoff. 
The Public-Private Differential among Nonunion Workers 
The evidence on this is mixed. The results of the CPS for 1973-75 
and of the PSID indicate that public and private sector nonunion work- 
ers have similar unemployment rates. The probability of unemployment 
due to a layoff is lower for public sector workers, but this is offset by 
a substantially  higher probability that a public sector worker will be 
unemployed following labor force reentrance. I suspect the much higher 
probability of unemployment following reentrance to the labor force 
may arise in part because in the mid-1970s the nonunion public sector 
group may contain a disproportionate number of disadvantaged work- 
ers who held  short-term, nonunion jobs through public employment 
programs. Furthermore, the results from the matched CPS data from 
1983 indicate that the probability of at least one unemployment  spell 
during the year and annual weeks of unemployment are both about 30 
percent lower  for public sector workers (see Allen 1986), although these 
results may be sensitive to the fact that they are for workers who were 
employed in May 1983. My reading of this mixed evidence is somewhat 
different from Allen’s in that I tentatively conclude that unemployment 
probabilities  are lower for nonunion  public  sector workers than for 300  Steven G. Allen 
nonunion private sector workers. However, the differential clearly is 
much smaller than the public-private differential among union members. 
With the data sources used in the study, the analysis could be im- 
proved and extended in a number of ways. First, one could use March 
and May CPS tapes from the mid-1970s to analyze weeks of  unem- 
ployment  and the probability  of  unemployment  over the  year for a 
sample of workers who were employed in May of the following year. 
Using the PSID, one could also analyze unemployment during the year 
for workers who were employed in  March or April of the following 
year. The results would be more comparable to Allen’s results for the 
March and May 1983 CPS and could be used to identify changes over 
time in the effects of public sector unionism. They might also shed 
light on the discrepancy in the findings based on the  1983 CPS data 
and the other results. 
Second, in analyzing unemployment by cause it would be useful to 
focus more attention on distinguishing between effects on the incidence 
of  layoffs and quits and the amount of  unemployment conditional on 
a layoff or quit. The probability that a person is unemployed  at the 
time of the CPS survey, due, for example, to an indefinite layoff reflects 
both the probability of an indefinite layoff and the duration of unem- 
ployment conditional on a layoff. 
Third, careful consideration should be given to the effects of public 
employment programs, such as CETA, on the estimates of union-non- 
union and public-private differentials in the 1970s. 
Fourth, it would be useful to analyze the effect that growth in public 
sector unionism during the 1960s and early 1970s has had on the public- 
private sector differential in turnover rates and unemployment. Figure 
10.1 and the tables of  descriptive statistics in the paper suggest that 
the public-private unemployment rate differential has not increased or 
(as Allen argues) has actually narrowed during this period. The data 
and discussion in Freeman (1986, 44-45) suggest that the percentage 
of public sector workers in unions and associations acting like unions 
increased from about 15 percent in the early 1960s to about 40 percent 
in the late 1970s, although Freeman emphasizes that problems of data 
comparability over time and changes in the distinction between asso- 
ciations and unions make it difficult to provide precise estimates of the 
growth of public sector unionism. Taken at face value, the estimate of 
-  1.8 percentage points for the union-nonunion differential in the public 
sector (see table 10.5, row 5) implies that this increase in public sector 
union membership would lead to a modest reduction in the unemploy- 
ment rate of 0.45 percentage points. For comparison, the unemploy- 
ment probability was typically between 2 and 3 percent in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. 
How does one explain the discrepancy between the cross-section 
findings and the time-series trends? First, other changes in public and 301  Unions and Job Security 
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are also likely to be differences in the speed of adjustment of output 
and employment to changes in demand. There is evidence to suggest 
that in  the public  sector the unions  have greater ability  to stabilize 
demand than in the private sector. It would be useful to examine and 
compare the cyclical and seasonal variability of firm expenditures and 
government expenditures. One could also compare the variability  of 
relative demand shifts within the public sector and within the private 
sector using techniques similar to those of Lilien (1982). In a study of 
employment growth by industry and province in Canada (Altonji and 
Ham 1986), the variability  in innovations in government employment 
in each province was found to be lower than in all other sectors of the 
economy except services because government employment is less re- 
sponsive to external and national  shocks to the economy and less 
responsive to shocks to each province. Most of the response of gov- 
ernment employment growth to these shocks occurs with  a lag.  We 
also found that the variance of shocks to employment that are specific 
to the public sector and common to all provinces are smaller than the 
variances of shocks that are specific to most other sectors. Freeman 
(1985) shows that employment in the public sector is less responsive 
to cyclical fluctuations than employment in the private  sector. More 
work in this area is needed, particularly  studies of the variability  of 
expenditures and studies that control for union coverage. 
One could examine the other links connecting demand to layoffs. 
Briefly, one could investigate sectoral differences in the response of 
man-hours to output or expenditure changes.  These are likely to be 
affected by the degree of wage flexibility. 
One could also examine public-private and union-nonunion  differ- 
ences in  the extent that the man-hours  adjustment is made  through 
hours per week or  through employment changes. Work rules concerning 
hours reductions, overtime provisions,  the unemployment  insurance 
system, and the ability of unions to resist work force reductions will 
influence how man-hours adjustments are made. 
Finally, one could examine the response of layoff, quit, and hire rates 
to a given change in employment. This is likely to be heavily influenced 
by differences in layoff costs. Higher wage levels will tend to reduce 
the quit rate and make it necessary to rely more heavily on layoffs. 
Casual  empiricism  suggests that the government sector relies  more 
heavily on attrition and hiring freezes to adjust the work force. Civil 
service rules, the ability of labor to impose political costs on govern- 
ments that use layoffs, and the predictability of labor demand changes 
may provide a partial explanation. 
In summary, this paper has uncovered some important public-private 
and union-nonunion  differences in turnover behavior and unemploy- 
ment risk. The institutional background  and econometric analysis in 
the paper are a very good base for future researchers to build upon. 303  Unions and Job Security 
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